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On the Interaction between Transfer Restrictions and Crediting 
Strategies in Guaranteed Funds 
 
 
Eric R. Ulm1 
Georgia State University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Guaranteed funds with crediting rates for fixed periods determined by a Pension 
Provider or Insurance Company are common features of accumulation annuity contracts. 
Policyholders can transfer money back and forth between these accounts and Money 
Market accounts which give them features similar to demand deposits and yet they 
frequently credit a higher rate than the Money Market. Transfer restrictions are commonly 
employed to prevent arbitrage. In this paper, we model the interaction between company 
and policyholder as a multiperiod game in which the company maximizes risk-neutral 
expected present value of profits and the policyholder maximizes his expected discounted 
utility. We find that the optimal strategy on the part of the company is to credit a rate higher 
than money market rate in the first period to entice the policyholder to invest in the 
guaranteed fund. The company then credits the floor in the remaining periods as the 
policyholder transfers out the maximum amount. This does better for the policyholder in 
low interest rate environments and worse in high interest rate environments and acts as a 
type of “interest rate insurance” for the policyholder. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the major problems in modern financial planning is accumulating assets 
over a working lifetime to provide sufficient income in retirement. Defined Contribution 
Pension Plans have become increasingly common in recent years. Employees deposit 
money at regular intervals into a designated account. These contributions are frequently 
matched at some level by the employers. The employee can direct the funds to a number 
of different accounts. Subject to only a few restrictions, they can rebalance their portfolio 
whenever they want. 
Most DC plans have stock funds, bond funds and mixed funds, all of which have 
the possibility of losing money in bad markets. In addition, many DC plans have a money 
market account which credits a short-term interest rate and cannot1 lose money. A 
significant number of plans also contain a “Guaranteed Fund” which credits a rate 
guaranteed for a fixed period, often monthly or quarterly. These funds are backed by 
longer term assets and the rate quoted for the time period is usually dependent on the 
book return of these assets less a spread that covers expenses and insurer profits. 
Unlike bond funds, which can lose money if interest rates rise and the bond 
market values fall, these funds are usually redeemable at book value and cannot lose 
money. In addition, there is a minimum crediting rate for these contracts. This rate is 
required by state non-forfeiture laws but the insurance company could set a higher rate 
for marketing reasons. 
                                                 
1 It is theoretically possible for a money market fund to lose money. This had happened to only three funds 
in the 37 years prior to the recent financial crisis. Events of September 2008 prompted the US Treasury to 
guarantee Money Market funds. 
Prevention of arbitrage between money market funds and Guaranteed Funds is a 
major issue for insurance companies. If there were no restrictions on transfers between 
these accounts, savvy policyholders would transfer their money into the highest earning 
account. The Money Market account would respond quickly to rises in interest rates, 
while the Guaranteed Funds would respond with a lag. Money would be transferred out 
of the Guaranteed Fund when rates are high, exactly the moment when the asset market 
value is lower than book value and assets would need to be sold at a loss. In practice, 
insurance companies try to mitigate this reaction by imposing transfer restrictions, 
whereby an individual can transfer out only a fixed percentage of his Guaranteed Fund in 
any given time period. 
In this paper, we determine the optimal crediting strategy on Guaranteed Funds 
from the perspective of maximizing the risk-adjusted profit to the pension provider. We 
then compare this to crediting strategies observed in practice. 
 
2. The Model 
 
 We will use a game-theoretical model to analyze the interplay between the actions 
of the Pension Provider (hereafter PP) and the Policyholder (hereafter PH). PP’s goal is 
to maximize his present value of the expected future book profit stream under the Q  
measure. PH’s goal is to maximize the expected discounted utility under the P  measure. 
It could be argued that in the absence of frictions, PH should instead maximize the 
expected present value under the Q  measure as well. There are, however, frictions in this 
case. The policyholder is unable to sell his pension to a third party and is typically unable 
to inexpensively hedge his risk. In these situations, using expected utility under the P  
measure is arguably correct (see, for instance, Gao and Ulm (2012), Leung and Sircar 
(2009) or Shreve (2003) page 70). 
At time t , the universe is in state (filtration) tF . This includes the current interest 
rate environment, the insurers current assets and the policyholders’ current allocation. Let 
,t is  represent the current zero-coupon rate for a duration of  i  years. Let ,t ijA  represent 
the dollar amount in a zero-coupon asset with a remaining duration of  i  years and ,t ijr  
represent the book interest rate on that asset. j  is an index that runs over all possible 
purchase dates for assets with a remaining duration of i  years. For instance, a current 
bond with a two year duration could be a three-year bond purchased last year, a four-year 
bond purchased two years ago, and so on. These bonds would have different book rates 
since they were purchased at different times. Let t  represent the percentage of assets 
currently allocated to the money market account. 
The “game” proceeds as follows. At time t : 
1. PP picks cr , the rate he will credit for the next time period. 
2. PH picks his allocation, 1t  , which becomes a state variable for the next 
period. 
3. PP buys assets, which become state variables for the next period. 
 
 
2.1 Zero-Sum Analysis with no Transfer Restrictions and no Crediting Floor 
 
 To motivate the importance of a risk-averse policyholder who maximizes his 
expected utility under the P  measure, we will here analyze the zero-sum case where the 
policyholder maximizes his expected value under the Q  measure.  
 
Proposition 2.1: PP’s asset purchase strategy is independent of his crediting strategy and 
independent of PH’s choices. 
 
Proof: PP attempts to maximize 
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assets to maximize the first sum, and playing the game with PH in order to minimize the 
second sum. Therefore, the insurer acts to maximize the asset values and minimize the 
liability values. 
 
The result of Proposition 2.1 might be counterintuitive for actuaries, since 
Guaranteed Funds frequently credit a rate that is tied, at least loosely, to the returns on the 
underlying asset portfolio and Proposition 2.1 says this is not optimal. 
Proposition 2.1 holds even if the insurer is required to back money-market funds 
with short-term assets in a separate account. If he desires less short-term exposure than 
this, PP can adjust the overall asset portfolio by borrowing short-term to buy extra long-
term assets in the General Account backing the Guaranteed Fund. 
 
Proposition 2.2: PP is indifferent to his asset strategy. 
 
Proof: This is a basic consequence of the above propositions and the Modigliani-Miller 
Theorems (1958, 1961) stating that companies are indifferent to capital structure and 
dividend policy. 
 
The result of Proposition 2.2 might be counterintuitive to actuaries who are used 
to attempting to match the durations of assets to the durations of liabilities, but 
indifference to asset strategy is common in the financial literature as seen in the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958). This indifference to asset strategy will not hold in the 
presence of frictions regarding borrowing costs, differential tax treatment, or bankruptcy 
costs. We assume here that this contract is a small enough piece of PP’s overall portfolio 
that the firm can borrow internally and the contract has a negligible effect on PP’s overall 
brankruptcy probability. 
As a consequence of Proposition 2.2, we will allow the insurer to invest 100% in 
short-term assets for ease of analysis. In this case, the only state variable needed at a 
particular time is the short-term rate and a full yield curve model is unnecessary. 
 
Proposition 2.3: If there are no transfer restrictions, PP will credit a rate ,1c tr r  and PH 
will allocate 1 1t    or PP will credit ,1c tr r  and PH will allocate 10 1t   . 
 
Proof: Suppose the PP credits ,1c tr r . If the policyholder invests 1 0t    he earns a rate 
less than cr  and can improve by investing 1 0t    in the current period. This doesn’t 
affect his choice set in the next period, so the policyholder gains by a strategy change. If 
the policyholder invests 1 0t   , the PP could improve his result by lowering his 
crediting rate. Therefore, no Nash equilibrium exists with ,1c tr r . 
If the PP credits  ,1c tr r  and PH allocates 10 1t   , the PH earns ,1tr  and 
cannot improve by a deviation. If the PP lowers his crediting rate, the PH transfers to 
1 0t    and there is no improvement. Therefore, this is an equilibrium. 
If the PP credits  ,1c tr r  and PH allocates 1 1t   , the PH earns less than ,1tr  and 
cannot improve by allocating 1 1t   . Therefore, this is not an equilibrium . 
If the PP credits  ,1c tr r  and PH allocates 1 1t   , the PH earns ,1tr  and neither 
benefits from a deviation. Therefore, this is an equilibrium. 
 
 
Proposition 2.4: At any given time and state with 1t  , the expected present value of 
future book profits under Q  is the market value of the assets less the book value of the 
assets. Specifically, the expectation at initiation of the contract is 0. 
 
Proof: The proof is by induction. We assume from proposition 2.4 that liabilities always 
earn 1,1tr   in period 1t  . The expected present value of future  book profits at time 1t   
is equal to the book profits earned in the next period plus the discounted expected present 
value of book profits at time t . Assume that in all states j  at time t , the expected present 
value of book profits from that moment forward is (j) (j)t tMV BV . Assume there are n  
assets of book value iA  and book return ir . The value of book profits is the change in 
book value of assets, 
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  since the sum of the book asset values is the account value. Therefore, the 
expected present value of future  book profits at time 1t   is: 
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Now, the first term is just the definition of the market value of assets 1tMV  . The book 
value of assets in the next period is independent of state and equal to 
1
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  so the 
expected present value of future  book profits at time 1t   is: 
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2.2 Zero-Sum Analysis with Transfer Restrictions 
 
We will now extend the analysis to include the existence of transfer restrictions. 
At the end of any period, the money in the money market account is free to be transferred 
in whole or in part to the guaranteed fund. On the other hand, only a percentage x  can be 
transferred out of the guaranteed account into the money market account. A percentage 
1 x  must remain in the guaranteed account for the next period. 
 
Proposition 2.5: In the presence of transfer restrictions, the only reasonable allocations in 
the period 1t   are 1 0t    and 1 (1 )t tx x      (or complete indifference to 
allocation). The decision of which allocation to choose is independent of the current 
allocation t . 
 
Proof: Imagine the PH has three independent accounts: 
1. A guaranteed account of (1 )(1 )tx    which must remain in the guaranteed 
account and cannot be affected by the PH’s current choice. 
2. A guaranteed account of (1 )tx   currently allocated to the guaranteed account 
but fully allocatable in the next period. 
3. A money market account of t  currently allocated to the money market account 
but fully allocatable in the next period. 
This is identical to the situation in the presence of transfer restrictions. Since Funds 2 and 
3 are identical going forward they should be allocated identically in the next period and 
should have the same present value to the PH. Consider Fund 3 first. In the next period, 
some of it will be allocated to Fund 1, some to Fund 2 and some to Fund 3. The total 
value is the weighted average of the amount allocated to Funds 1, 2 and 3. Fund 2 and 3 
are equally valuable, so if Fund 1 going forward is more valuable than Fund 3, all of 
Fund 3 should be moved to Fund 1. Otherwise, it should all be retained in Fund 3. The 
same is true of Fund 2. Therefore, either all of Funds 2 and 3 should be moved to Fund 1 
or all should be move to Fund 3. These situations correspond to 1 0t    and 
1 (1 )t tx x      respectively. Indifference is obtained if Funds 1 and 3 are equally 
valuable going forward. The decision is based entirely on the future values of Funds 1 
and 3 and is therefore independent of current allocation t . 
 
The arguments in the above proofs are very useful because they shows that the 
PP’s strategy can be analyzed solely by the effect it produces on the actions of a 
policyholder invested in Fund 3, i.e. the Money Market Fund. This will be valuable in the 
proof of the main result in this section. 
 
Proposition 2.6: In the first period, the policyholder is free to invest at any value of 
10 1  . If there are transfer restrictions, PP will credit a rate c critr r  where 1,1critr r   
and depends on time and state. PH will allocate 1 1   if c critr r  and 10 1   if 
c critr r . 
 
Proof: If the PP credits 1,1cr r , there is no advantage to PH to investing 1 1   since the 
profit in the first period would be less than (or equal to) the profits at 1 1   and the 
options are limited in the next period. In fact, 1 1   is a strict result even at 1,1cr r  since 
an allocation with 1 1   allows the PP to credit “0” in subsequent periods and the 
policyholder takes the loss as he slowly transfers his Guaranteed Funds back to the 
money market2 To compensate for the losses when “trapped”, the PP will have to credit 
an amount greater than 1,1r  to induce PH to transfer any funds at all into the Guaranteed 
                                                 
2 We have not yet shown that the two parties do not have superior strategies to this one, but the mere 
existence of this strategy is sufficient to prove the Proposition. 
Account. There will be a rate 
c critr r  in which the profit in the first period exactly 
compensates for the expected present value of losses from the “trap”. If c critr r , the 
policyholder will invest 1 1   since the first period gains are insufficient to cover the 
expected losses in future periods. If c critr r , PH is indifferent to choice of fund 
allocation and can choose any 10 1  . PP will not credit c critr r  since it gives away 
money in the first period without changing PH behavior beyond that produced by c critr r
. 
 
 Proposition 2.6 implies that the contract has a value of “0” at initiation, since 
crediting t,1cr r  and allocating 1t   is always a possible equilibrium and has a value of 
“0”. Crediting c critr r  makes PH indifferent to this outcome, and therefore must also 
have a value to PH of “0” and, by the zero-sum property of the game, to PP as well. 
 
Proposition 2.7: The value of critr  is independent of the state variable t . 
 
Proof: This is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.5, i.e. that a strategy can be 
evaluated only by its effect on policyholders invested solely in Money Market Funds and 
that PP optimal strategies are independent of allocation t . 
 
Proposition 2.8: If 0t  , PP should set 0cr   
 
Proof: We will first prove that the only rates that PP should credit are 0cr   and c critr r  
and then show that 0cr   gives the more favorable result to PP. From Propositions 2.5-
2.7, if PP credits 0 c critr r  , the policyholder will wish to invest Funds 2 and 3 in 
Money Market accounts and therefore no value of cr  in this range will change behavior, 
or alter the profit on Funds 2 and 3. On the other hand, the lower the value of cr , the 
greater the gain on Fund 1 to PP. Therefore 0cr   does better for PP than any other value 
of c critr r . 
 Similarly, if PP credits c critr r , the policyholder will wish to invest in Fund 1 and 
therefore no value of cr  in this range will change behavior. On the other hand, the lower 
the value of cr , the lower the loss on Fund 1 to PP. Therefore c critr r  does better than 
any other value of c critr r . We therefore need only evaluate 0cr   or c critr r  from the 
perspective of PP. 
 Now, from Propositions 2.6 and 2.7, c critr r  is the rate that makes a person 
indifferent between Money Market and Guaranteed Accounts and crediting c critr r  is 
revenue-neutral relative to crediting t,1cr r  in perpetuity
3. Now, clearly, crediting 0cr   
followed by crediting t,1cr r  in perpetuity is better than this, and crediting 0cr   
followed by optimal crediting in future periods is, by definition, at least as good as 
                                                 
3 Crediting t,1cr r in perpetuity is not optimal according to this argument, but it does not need to be for 
the argument to carry through. I need only show that c critr r  followed by subsequent optimal crediting is 
equivalent to crediting t,1cr r  in perpetuity and that crediting 0cr   in the first period followed by 
optimal crediting does better than crediting  t,1cr r  in perpetuity. 
crediting t,1cr r  in future periods. In fact, it is strictly better since we’ve shown that 
t,1cr r  is not optimal in the next period, only c critr r  or 0cr   could be. 
 
Propositions 2.6-2.8 are interesting results, as they allows the PP to credit a rate 
on the Guaranteed Account that is higher than that on the Money Market Account, which 
is seen empirically. On the other hand, they imply that the insurer will credit “0” on 
Guaranteed Accounts after the first year, which disagrees with real PP practice. They also 
imply that PH will place no funds in the Guaranteed Account at initiation of the contract 
unless c critr r  exactly. It is possible that companies can overcome the implication that 
they must credit “0” through contractual precommitments. This could explain the 
prevalence of situations where PP credit a spread below their portfolio rates. It also 
explains situations where policyholders can exit the General Account with an annuity 
whose rate is related to the current market rates. 
 
Proposition 2.9: If PP credits an interest rate larger than critr , and PH can borrow and 
lend at prevailing rates outside the pension plan, an arbitrage opportunity exists for PH. 
 
Proof: Neither the PP or PH strategy is state dependent if PP credits c critr r  followed by 
0cr   in subsequent periods and PH puts 100% of his money in the Guaranteed Account 
at time 0 and moves x  percent deterministically to the money market every period 
afterwards. The present value of this under the Q  measure is 
1
1
1
c
crit
r
r



since Proposition 
2.7 implies that PH is indifferent between the Guaranteed Account and the Money 
Market Account worth $1 if  c critr r . 
To set up the arbitrage, PH borrows $1 to invest in the Pension Guaranteed 
Account. He borrows at prevailing rates in such a way as to repay (1 ) (1 )t critx x r   at 
integer times 0t  . The present value of this stream is $1 from Proposition 2.7. He 
repays these values by borrowing at money-market rates, and accumulates an outstanding 
debt at retirement equal to the value of these cash-flows accumulated at short-term rates. 
 Inside the account, PH receives cash flows of (1 ) (1 )t cx x r   to invest in the 
Money Market. These funds accumulate at retirement to a value 
1
1
c
crit
r
r


 times his 
accumulated external debt. When the assets and debts are netted at retirement, the amount 
is guaranteed to be positive. 
 This case, where PP credits “0” in subsequent periods is worst case for PH. If PP 
credits 0cr  , the internal invested cash flows are event higher and the net amount 
available at retirement is an even larger positive number. 
 
 
3. Analysis Assuming Utility Maximizing Policyholders 
 
 We now consider the non-zero sum case where the PP can hedge and therefore 
attempts to maximize the expected value of future profits under the Q  measure whereas 
the PH attempts to maximize expected value of the utility of his ending fund under the P  
measure. 
 Proposition 3.1: The results of Propositions 2.3-2.4 hold even when PH attempts to 
maximize expected utility under the P  measure. 
 
Proof: The equilibrium arguments for PP deviations in the proof of Proposition 2.4 are 
still valid. Also, as long as utility is increasing in money amount, the PH deviation 
arguments in the proof of Proposition 2.3 remain valid. Therefore, the assumption that 
liabilities always earn 1,1tr   in period 1t   remains valid and the argument in Proposition 
2.4 carries through unchanged. 
 
Now, an individual who is even risk-averse in fund outcomes will often prefer a 
crediting strategy of critr  in period “1” followed by “0” in subsequent periods to a 
strategy where PP credits the money market rate at all periods. You might expect from 
the definition of critr , these two strategies would have equal mean outcomes, but the 
outcomes will typically be lower on average for the “credit critr ” strategy due to  the 
effects of time-dependent discount rates. On the other hand, the first strategy produces 
better (worse) ending fund values in low (high) interest rate scenarios because the cost of 
crediting “0” is less (more) in these scenarios. Therefore, the first strategy might easily be 
preferred by a risk-averse investor. 
Also, if the P  measure has larger probabilities for low interest scenarios relative 
to the Q  measure which is typical given the bias toward rising yield curves, an individual 
who maximizes expected values under the P  measure could easily prefer a crediting 
strategy of critr  in period “1” followed by “0” in subsequent periods to a strategy where 
PP credits the money market rate at all periods. The P  measure overweights low-interest 
rate scenarios where the first strategy produces larger values than the second strategy and 
underweights high-interest rate scenarios where the first strategy produces smaller values 
than the second strategy. This increases the mean outcome of the first strategy, and 
therefore raises its desirability to a risk-neutral investor who values under the P  measure. 
These results suggest that PPs in perfect competition will credit critr  in period “1” 
followed by “0” in subsequent periods if frictions are such that *any* of their 
policyholders are influenced by the expectation of the utility of the fund under the real 
world probability measure. 
Of course, if the PP credits the full value of critr  in the first period, he has a zero 
profit and the entire surplus goes to the consumer. He could lower his first-period 
crediting rate to Pcritr , the rate that would make a risk averse policyholder who values 
under the P  measure infinitesimally prefer the Guaranteed Account. In this case all the 
surplus is captured by the producer. In reality, some value 
P
crit c critr r r   would be 
credited depending on the bargaining power of the two agents. 
 
4. Analysis including the Effect of Minimum Guarantees 
 
Now assume there is a minimum credited rate minr  which is either set by law or 
contractually guaranteed. The results of Proposition 2.6 follow through unchanged. 
Proposition 2.9 could be restated as “If 0t  , PP should set mincr r ”, but the proof is 
similar. The arguments used in Section 3  regarding risk-averse policyholders under the 
P  measure are still reasonable. 
It is possible now, however, for minr  to exceed critr  at some times in some states of 
the world. In this case, PH will move all funds to the Guaranteed Accounts. Since PP 
credits more than critr , the expected profits to PP under the Q  measure are negative. This 
contract, therefore, has a negative expectation at issue. This would seem to imply that the 
PP would not issue such a contract. On the other hand, his bargaining power may allow 
him to lower the first period crediting rate far enough to create an expectation of a 
positive profit and allow the contract to be issued. 
While this situation does exist in practice, it is also similar to one where 
withdrawals are allowed by way of a “transfer payout annuity” with a fixed term and rate. 
The “minimum rate” in this case is usually time-dependent and tied to the market in some 
fashion. If this rate is contractually tied to a reference rate, this is a way PP can pre-
commit to crediting more than “0” and reduce the value of critr  necessary to entice 
policyholders to choose the Guaranteed Account. 
 
5. Numerical Examples 
 
 We now turn our attention to some numerical calculations of the critical rate. The 
behavior of PP and PH is fully deterministic and not interest sensitive when min 0r   , so 
critr  is completely determined by today’s yield curve and is not dependent on an interest 
rate model. It does, however, depend on the transfer restriction x . When min 0r  , PH 
strategy does depend on the state of the world and we will need a full interest rate model. 
In addition, Pcritr  does depend on the interest rate model used because it depends 
on the full distribution of final outcomes which is model sensitive. Pcritr  also depends on 
the precise form of the PH utility function and the Radon-Nikodym Derivative of the Q  
measure relative to the P  measure. 
 
5.1 Determination of critr  when min 0r   
 
 The case of a level yield curve with rate r  can be straightforwardly evaluated and 
demonstrates the method that will be used for non-level yield curves. The value of any 
money in the money market account at 0t  is $1. Putting $1 into the Guaranteed 
Account produces $(1 )critr  in one year. The Guaranteed Account then no longer grows 
in future years. A fraction x  is transferred out every year and the present value of these 
transfers must equal $1 for PH to be indifferent between the funds. That is, 
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Which solves nicely for: 
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When 1x  , critr r  which agrees with Proposition 2.4. 
 Now, in cases where the yield curve is not flat, the denominator in Equation (3) is 
easily adjusted by replacing (1 )tr  by (1 )tts  where ts  represents the t  year spot rate at 
the initiation of the contract. If the one-year forward rates after the first year are level at 
1f  and the one-year spot rate is 0s , Equation (3) becomes: 
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which again solves nicely for 
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This moves linearly from 0
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 when transfers are completely disallowed to 0s , in 
agreement with Proposition 2.4, when there are no transfer restrictions. This general 
pattern of movement from long-term to short term rates when transfer restrictions are 
removed is a general feature of the model for arbitrary yield curves. 
 Figure 1 shows the behavior of the critical rate from 1/1990 to 5/2014 when 
25%x  . We also examined the correlations between critr  (for x =1%, 5%, 10%, 25% 
and 50%) and treasury rates (at 1 year, 5 year, 10 year and 30 year durations). We find 
large correlations in general. The largest correlations for 1%x  , 5%x   and 10%x   
are with the 10 year rate, 25%x   with the 5 year rate and 50%x   with the 1 year rate. 
All of these maximum correlations are above 0.989. These correlations are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
5.2 Determination of critr  when min 0r   
 
 We first examine the case where mincritr r  at all times and in all future states of 
world (the static case). In this situation, PP should credit minr  in future periods and the 
policyholder should withdraw the maximum amount possible. In the case of a level yield 
curve, Equation (3) becomes: 
1 1
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which solves for: 
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mincrit
r r
r r
x

                  (8) 
which again equals the short-term rate when 1x  , consistent with Proposition 2.4. 
The equivalent of Equation (5) now solves for: 
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Which can be either positive or negative depending on whether the long-term rate is 
larger or smaller than the minimum crediting rate. If the credited rate at time 0 is larger 
than this static amount, an arbitrage opportunity analogous to the one in Proposition 2.10 
exists. 
In reality, this “static” case ignores a number of important options possessed by 
PH. For instance, PH can empty his Guaranteed Account as described above and still 
retain the option to transfer back to the Guaranteed Account if minr  exceeds critr  at some 
point in the future, which increases the value of Guaranteed Account funds. In addition, 
Money Market funds are worth more than $1 as the PH has the option to move money to 
the Guaranteed Account if minr  ever exceeds critr . This implies that the true, dynamic critr  
must equal or exceed the short-term rate, otherwise the money market would be 
preferable as the option value on money market funds exceeds that on Guaranteed Funds. 
To see the effect of these options on critr  we calibrate a Black-Derman-Toy (BDT) 
model with volatility 14% to the treasury curves. This volatility is consistent with values 
in Coleman, Fisher and Ibbotson (1991), Radhakrishnan (1998) and Damberg and 
Gullnäs (2012). The results are not particularly sensitive to the choice of volatility 
parameter. 
 Figure 2 shows the dynamic and static values of critr  for a minimum crediting rate 
of 3%. The values are nearly indistinguishable except in those cases where the dynamic 
rate is essentially equal to the one-year treasury rate. Although not visible in the graph, 
the dynamic value is about 3-5 bp below the static value reflecting the option value of re-
entering the Guaranteed Account. If PP credits above the static value, an arbitrage 
opportunity exists. If PP credits above the dynamic value but below the static one, the 
BDT model suggests that PH should put funds in the Guaranteed Account. This 
conclusion is dependent on the accuracy of the model, however, and does not necessarily 
represent an arbitrage opportunity for PH. 
 
5.3 Determination of 
P
critr . 
 
 As in section 5.2, we will use the calibrated Black-Derman-Toy Model. We 
assume CRRA policyholders. That is, we assume they have a utility function 
1
( )
1
w
U w





. Figure 3 shows the values of Pcritr  for 0   and 3  .  As expected, the 
values for risk-neutral individuals ( 0  ) are above the critical rates in figure 1 and the 
values for reasonably risk-averse individuals ( 3  ) are below both the risk-neutral and 
Figure 1 values. 
 
6. Crediting in Practice 
 
 We now turn our attention to an empirical analysis of the typical crediting 
strategies of pension providers. Our analysis spans the period from 1990-2011 inclusive. 
We look at two questions. First, were there any companies and time periods where the 
arbitrage relationship in Proposition 2.9 was present? Second, what aspects of a 
company’s assets and the interest rate environment predict crediting rates? 
 We determine a companies credited rate from the information provided in 
publicly available NAIC statements. We take interest credited to be the tabular interest in 
the Group Annuities column of the “Analysis of Increase in Reserves and Deposit Funds 
During the Year”. Prior to 2000 this was divided into “Reserves” and “Deposit Funds” 
but in 2000 and later the two amounts were combined. Because of this, it is unclear in 
some cases whether a particular rate is one that is credited on policyholder controlled 
funds. Relevant transfer restrictions are also unavailable. The crediting rate was estimated 
by dividing the tabular interest into the average of the beginning and ending reserves for 
the year. This will be the dependent variable in the later regression analysis. 
Figure 4 shows the median credited rate, as well as the 90th and 10th percentiles, 
for those companies with positive (non-zero) group annuity reserves. It also shows some 
of the critical rates from Figures 1-3 as well as a short term rate. Companies typically, but 
not always, credit more than money market rates. For example, many policyholders 
between 1993-2000 as well as 2005-2007 would do well to transfer as much money as 
allowed into the money-markets. It also seems likely that at least some arbitrage 
possibilities existed between 2001-2004 and, more recently, 2011-2012. 
We performed a least-squares regression on the data to find the determinants of 
company crediting strategies. The dependent variable was the amount credited and the 
independent variables were: “Assets”, “NII on line”, “Proportionally Allocated Company 
NII”, “Short Term Interest Crediting”, “5 Year Interest Crediting” and “10 Year Interest 
Crediting”. The Assets were calculated as the average of the starting and ending reserves 
used in the denominator of the credited rate calculation. NII on line was obtained from 
the Analysis of Operations by Line of Business page of the NAIC statement for the 
Group Annuities column. “Proportionally Allocated Company NII” calculated what the 
NII would have been on the line of business had they had the same NII rate as the 
company as whole. The “Short Term Interest Crediting”, “5 Year Interest Crediting” and 
“10 Year Interest Crediting” variables were the amounts that would have been earned by 
the line if the assets had earned exactly the “Short Term”, “5 Year”  and “10 Year” 
treasury rates respectively. The results of the regression are shown in Table 2. The R-
squared of the regression is quite high, 0.9813. 
 All coefficients are quite statistically significant. The results are 
reasonable and can be interpreted straightforwardly. The negative intercept implies that a 
typical company builds in about $3,500,000 of profit (after the effects of the various NII 
and interest rates) regardless of size. The average company has about $1,100,000,000 in 
group annuity assets so this about 0.32% of assets for a typical company. The coefficient 
on “Assets” is 0.0061, implying that a typical company credits about 0.61% independent 
of external rates or its own investment performance. The credited rate averaged over all 
years and companies is about 6.23% so only about 1/10th of the interest credited is 
constant independent of company or economic circumstances. The typical spread profit 
per company per year (NII on line less Interest Credited) is about $33,800,000 per year or 
about 3.08% of assets, mostly because interest rates have been declining through most of 
the period and Credited Rates have fallen faster than NII rates. 
It appears that external rates matter more than internal investment performance, as 
suggested by Proposition 2.1. For example, if the company wide NII rate rises by 1% (in 
a way which causes the Line NII rate to also rise 1%), the Credited Rate will only rise by 
0.12%. On the other hand, if the external yield curve rises by 1% (all three rates in 
parallel), the Credited Rate will rise by 0.86%. If all rates, internal and external, rise by 
1%, the Credited Rate will rise by 0.986% so almost, but not quite all, of the extra return 
is passed through to policyholders. 
The pattern of coefficients on the NII variables suggests that increasing the return 
on either line specific or company-wide non-line specific assets results in higher crediting 
rates although the effect of line specific assets is larger. The pattern of coefficients on 
Treasury Rate variables suggests that the 10-year rate is a strong determinant of Crediting 
Rates. In addition, the slope between the 5-year and 10-year rate is also quite important, 
suggesting that expectations of increasing returns in the future might produce higher 
Crediting Rates today (or that the Crediting Rates might depend on an even longer rate, 
say the 30 year, which is not always available). 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, we examine the interaction between crediting strategies on 
guaranteed funds and transfer restrictions. We show that the optimal strategy for a 
pension provider is to credit a critical rate during the first year and credit the lowest 
possible legal or contractually allowed rate thereafter. The policyholder’s optimal 
strategy is to enter the guaranteed fund at initiation of the contract and then transfer the 
maximum possible amount into the money market until the guaranteed fund is emptied. 
 If the pension provider credits more than the critical rate during the first year, an 
arbitrage opportunity exists for the policyholder. This has likely happened during some 
years for some companies since 1990. The effect of the arbitrage is mitigated somewhat 
since it is not scalable (policyholders have a maximum amount they can deposit in tax-
deferred accounts) and policyholders cannot, in practice, borrow at the money-market 
rate. 
 We also examine how Credited Rates are determined in practice for U.S. 
insurance companies. We find that the effect of external treasury rates is far larger than 
the effect of internal investment returns, consistent with theoretical expectations. 
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Figure 1. 
critr  vs. time for min 0r   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Static and Dynamic Critical Rates for 
min 3%r   
 
Figure 3. Pcritr  vs. Time for Risk-Averse Policyholders. 
 
Figure 4. Actual and Critical Credited Rates.  
 
Table 1. Correlation Between Critical Rates and Treasury Rates for Varying 
Durations and Transfer Restrictions. 
 
Treasury 
Transfer 
Restriction       
Duration 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 
1 0.862 0.892 0.919 0.962 0.989 
5 0.971 0.984 0.994 0.999 0.985 
10 0.996 0.999 0.998 0.980 0.946 
30 0.996 0.987 0.975 0.937 0.885 
Table 2. Regression Analysis 
  Coefficients Standard Error P-value 
Intercept -$3,547,190 $446,845 2.38E-15 
Assets 0.006 0.001 5.57E-17 
NII on Line 0.076 0.003 4.7E-101 
NII Proportional 0.049 0.009 1.59E-07 
Short Term 0.288 0.019 1.38E-49 
5 Year -1.634 0.073 3.9E-108 
10 Year 2.208 0.065 2.5E-234 
 
